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The paper provides an examination of China’s 2010 census data to evaluate its quality and to 
assess China’s demographic situation. The demographic trends revealed by the new census data 
suggest that China has entered a new demographic era characterized by prolonged low fertility, 
elevated sex ratios, rapid aging, fast urbanization and major geographic redistribution. How China 
responses to these demographic challenges will have profound implications for its social and 
economic future.
China carried out its 6th modern population census in 2010. It is another enumeration in 
grand scale. The census mobilized over 6 million enumerators 2 who visited over 400 
million households, and registered a total of 1.34 billion people. The census provides timely 
information for updating our understanding of demographic trends in China.
Data from the 2010 census indicates that China has entered a new demographic era. China’s 
population grew at a pace significantly slower than that had been anticipated by the Chinese 
government, averaging 5.7 per thousand over the 10-year period since the 2000 census, 
significantly below the 8–9 per thousand in the official projections for the same time period.
3 Such a growth rate was also drastically lower than that in the preceding two decades, when 
it was 14.4 and 11.0. This slower growth rate was primary a result of steady low fertility. 
Meanwhile, urbanization and geographic redistribution happened at an astonishing speed – 
population in urban centers like Shanghai and Beijing grew as much as 40 percent in one 
decade, whereas six inland provinces recorded negative population growth for the first time 
since the end of the Great Leap Forward famine. The census also shows that China’s 
population has undergone rapid aging – population aged 60 and above accounted for 13.3 
1I thank Guo Zhigang, William Lavely, and Wang Feng for their insightful comments, and support from the MacArthur Foundation, 
the Population Research Infrastructure Program awarded to the Carolina Population Center (R24 HD050924) by the Eunice Kennedy 
Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, and the National Science Foundation of China (71273059/
G030602).
2Two different numbers have been given for the number of enumerators. In its public Thank-You Letter published on Nov 15, 2010, 
China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) thanked “over 6 million enumerators and supervisors.” [http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjdt/
gjtjjdt/t20101116_402683510.htm]. The Communiqué on Major Figures of the 2010 Population Census put the total number of census 
workers at “about 10 million.”
3China’s official 10th 5-year plan, which covers the period of 2000–2005, projected China’s population to grow at an annual rate of 9 
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percent of the total population in 2010, up by 2.9 percentage points as compared with that 
from the 2000 census. All in all, the demographic situation in China is vastly different from 
the decade before.
This paper presents an overview of China demographic situations based on an examination 
of 2010 census data, mostly at the national level. The paper starts with a general discussion 
of census data quality. It then turns to detailed demographic analyses to evaluate major 
demographic indices, including mortality, fertility, sex ratio and regional distribution. It 
concludes with a discussion of the social and policy implications of China’s new 
demographic reality.
1. Challenges in Enumerating an Increasingly Mobile Population
Enumerating more than one billion people is not an easy task (Li 1984). Adding to this great 
challenge is the increasing mobility and diversity of the Chinese population. Three decades 
ago, population data from China were praised for their overall quality (Coale 1984), result of 
China’s still relatively immobile society, tightly controlled by a rigid household registration 
(hukou) system, and the widespread use of lunar and astrological dating of birth that 
facilitated reliable age counting. Subsequent economic liberalization and relaxation of 
migration controls unleashed population mobility. With more and more people, particularly 
peasants previously bound to the farmland, leaving their registration home to live and work 
in other locations, the hukou system became less capable of providing timely information 
about people’s whereabouts. Because the hukou system is the backbone of China’s 
population statistics system, including the censuses and surveys, people on the move are 
more likely to be missed or misclassified. Data quality, especially possible large-scale 
underenumeration, has been a major concern of researchers in the field of Chinese 
demography over the past two decades (e.g. Feeney and Yuan 1996; Goodkind 2011).
The implementation of the one-child policy since 1980 has further exacerbated the problem 
of underenumeration (Goodkind 2004; Merli and Raftery 2000; Zeng et al. 1996). The 
Chinese government has relied heavily on the hukou system to implement the one-child 
policy (Wang 2005; Gu et al. 2007). Not only does the hukou provide the basis of assigning 
family’s qualification for birth quotas, it is also used as a measure to punish families with 
children born without official quotas; those children are routinely denied registration and 
thus denied access to many government and social services, such as education, health care, 
and more. The evaluation and punishment associated with the one-child policy also give 
both families and local government strong incentives to hide the so-called out-of-plan births 
(Merli 1998; Scharping 2003, 2007). Analyses have shown that a substantial proportion of 
births and children were missed by the 1990 and 2000 censuses (Cai and Lavely 2003; 
Goodkind 2011; Zhang and Cui 2002).
China’s 2010 census took three major steps to address the problem of underenumeration. 
First, unlike the previous ones, the 2010 census registered both de jure and de facto 
populations: everyone was counted at where he/she was in the evening of October 31, 2010, 
regardless of the person’s household registration locale, and everyone was also counted at 
his/her household registration place no matter where he/she was that night. A computer 
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algorithm was used to determine whether a person should be counted as a resident. This new 
method was designed to minimize underenumeration of migrants who live in a place 
different from their official hukou – a major problem encountered in the previous censuses, 
especially in the 2000 census (Zhang and Cui 2002). In all previous censuses, in the period 
leading up to the census, the census takers had to carefully check everyone’s status to 
determine whom to be counted, and whom to be left out. More specifically, census-takers 
had to first judge whether to include a person based on the person’s hukou status and how 
long s/he has left his/her registration place to make sure that each person was only counted 
once. Those assessments were time consuming, and prone to error, often underenumeration, 
as migrants and people without hukou were often missed (Lavely 2001). In contrast, the 
2010 census enumerated everyone, sometimes twice, and then used a computer algorithm to 
differentiate residents from visitors. Mandating de facto and de jure counts greatly 
diminished the chance of underreporting. Using a computer algorithm that checks 
qualification of “residency” should also provide both better accuracy and better consistency. 
Of course, this new method increases the risk of double counting.
Second, families with children born without quota were provided opportunities to get 
registered in the hukou system before the census. According to a report by China’s official 
English-language newspaper China Daily, “People who violated family planning policies 
can apply for household registration by taking the opportunities of the census,” quoting Gu 
Yanzhou, deputy director of the Beijing Statistic Bureau. This was in fact a nation-wide 
measure mandated by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the government agency in 
charge of the hukou system. Although the measure was far from an amnesty for out-of-plan 
births, since birth control departments could still levy fines, it should have encouraged 
families to get their children registered in the system.4
Third, the census put special emphasis on enumerating everyone, with or without hukou. In 
the census manual, census-takers were reminded to check and register all out-of-plan births 
without hukou. The census also promised confidentiality that it would not pass on such 
information to birth control organizations as a basis for fines. According to Ma Jiantang, the 
Commissioner of NBS, the 2010 census enumerated a total of 13 million people with a 
pending household registration, a majority of whom were out-of-plan births.5 In 
comparison, the number with “pending household registration” was 8 million in the 2000 
census.
In addition to the above-mentioned specific measures to improve census quality, some 
institutional and organizational setups favored for a good enumeration. The implementation 
of the census was led by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) under the aegis of 
the Leading Group for the 6th Population Census, a special office established within the 
State Council that involved 25 different government agencies to coordinate the census. The 
group was headed by Vice Prime Minister Li Keqiang. Similar offices were also established 


























layer of Chinese society in combination of with an all-out mobilization campaign 
encourages a full participation in the census.
Moreover, the use of information technology facilitated data gathering and cross-validation. 
At the same time as increased population mobility makes it more difficult to track an 
individual’s whereabouts, movement also creates more opportunities to gather secondary 
and administrative data such as school enrollment, medical, and travel records. The 
revolution in information technology has greatly reduced the costs of gathering and 
managing such records, and has enhanced the control of data by the central government, 
which has long struggled with local agents to acquire accurate information. Secondary and 
administrative data provide the central authorities new tools to cross-validate population 
information collected from the census.
Combined, the new approaches and new technology lend the Chinese government high 
confidence about the 2010 census’s data quality. Answering a question at the press 
conference on the release of the Communiqué on Major Figures of the 2010 Population 
Census, Zhang Weimin, Deputy Commissioner of NBS responded that “it’s a top-quality 
census.” He further explained, without giving details, that this assessment was based on two 
lines of evidence. First, the post enumeration survey revealed a 0.12% net underenumeration 
rate, far lower than that of 2000, at 1.81%. Second, internal examination suggested that the 
census data are consistent with administrative statistics collected from other sources, such as 
“household registration data, education statistics, birth data provided by the birth control 
authority, and mortality data provided by the civil affairs authority.” Without further details 
on either the post enumeration survey or the consistency checks, however, census data 
quality should be regarded with caution.
2. Census Data Quality, First Look
The release of census data followed a similar protocol established by the previous three 
censuses, in 1982, 1990, and 2000. The first data release of the 2010 census came in the 
form of Communiqué on Major Figures of the 2010 Population Census (referred as 
Communiqué below). In June 2012, NBS released a three-volume compendium entitled 
Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the People’s Republic of China (referred as 
Tabulation below), including a digital version made available online at NBS’s website. 
Provincial level and county level tabulations are gradually coming out.
There are small, but important discrepancies between the Communiqué and the Tabulation, 
as the Communiqué was based on the so-called “quick aggregation” -- summary of 
enumeration totals aggregated and submitted by local census organizations, and the 
Tabulation was based on a full computer tabulation based on individual level. The total 
population provided with tabulation details (1,335.1 million) is about 4.6 million or 0.34% 
fewer than the number released in the Communiqué (1,339.7 million). Examination of 
population by region reveals that the two sets are virtually identical, except that the 
Communiqué includes 4.6 million “population with permanent residence difficult to define”. 
Similar discrepancies have also appeared in previous censuses. For example, for the 2000 
census, the total population enumerated (1,265.8, million) was 20.7 million more than the 
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published tabulations (1,245.1 million, including 2.5 million in military service). Judging 
from that, the 2010 census appears to have better quality than the 2000 census. The analysis 
below uses the combined sex age structure of the “National Population” and “Military 
Personnel” 6 and makes no adjustment for the 4.6 million “population with permanent 
residence difficult to define.”
The total population enumerated in the 2010 census is consistent with previous estimates 
provided by NBS. It is conventional that the NBS provides the latest (usually for the 
previous calendar year) population estimates, including year-end population, as well as 
birth, death and growth rates in its annual publication of China Statistical Yearbook, 
presumably based on its annual Population Change Survey and other related sources. It is 
also conventional that the NBS adjusts its previous population estimates following a census. 
For example, the birth rates of 1982–1989 were adjusted upward following the 1990 census, 
by as much as 18 percent; and total population sizes for those years were also adjusted 
accordingly. Similarly, following the 2000 census, the birth rates for 1998 and 1999 were 
adjusted downwards. Following the 2010 census, the NBS made a minor tweak to its 
estimate of population for 2009, with birth rate adjusted downwards from 12.13 to 11.95 
(per 1000), and total year-end population downwards by 240,000 (from 1,334.7 million to 
1,334.5 million) – a negligible amount for such a large population.
One factor that could have contributed to a better count in the 2010 census is the adoption 
and expanded use of China’s National Resident ID system, particularly the introduction of 
so-called Second-generation Resident ID system. China introduced its National Resident ID 
system in 1984. Chinese citizens who are 16 years or older can apply for their Resident ID 
card at their hukou place. The system started with some major design and implementation 
problems, such as non-unique ID number (number collisions), and easy forgery. In 2003, 
China introduced a newer, machine-readable, so-called Second-generation Resident ID card 
with an embedded IC-chip. The new ID card uses a new coding system to avoid the problem 
of number collision. With the IC-chip, along with other anti-counterfeiting measures, the 
newer card is more difficult to forge. The Resident ID card is now widely used, and often 
the only acceptable legal document for social, governmental as well as commercial services, 
such as marriage, employment, banking, passing security checkpoints at airports and buying 
train tickets. The National Resident ID system has made it much easier to maintain and to 
update China’s hukou system, which itself has undergone digitization over the past decade. 
With a better information infrastructure, the Ministry of Public Security has established a 
National Citizen ID Information System (NCIIS) that allows for real-time identity checking.
The population age structure from the 2010 census matches up well with that from the hukou 
system. Figure 1 compares the age structure recorded in the hukou system with that 
enumerated in the census. The household registration data are from the Ministry of Public 
Security’s NCIIS database with a standard time of June 30th, before it completed its system-
wide “rectification” prior to the 2010 census.7 The “rectification” was designed to clean and 
update the hukou system in preparation for the census, similar to what was done in previous 
6The Tabulation provides only limited information on military service personnel, including age structure, nationality, and education.
7The rectification to update the household registration system took place between January and September 2010.
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censuses (Lavely 2001). Overall, the two data sources display great consistency, especially 
in the middle part of the age distribution. The disparities for young ages and old ages are 
substantial, but not unexpected. For the age group 0–4, the count in the census is 75% larger 
than registered in the hukou system. For population aged 60 and above, consistency level 
drops as age goes up. For example, for 60–64, the census count is 96% of the registered; for 
80–84, the ratio declines to 70%, and for 90–94, the ratio further declines to 39%. The 
reason behind such an age pattern is rather simple: the hukou system is usually slow to 
register newborns and young children, and slow to purge the dead, both of which require 
administrative paperwork and bureaucratic record checking/keeping.
The consistency between the census and the hukou system, as shown above, lends some 
confidence in the census data. The good quality of Chinese census work has always 
depended on public security systems (namely the hukou, administered by the police). Now 
the growing sophistication of the Chinese security state (with ID cards and real time identity 
checking) is taking census accuracy to new heights. However, because the census and hukou 
system are not entirely independent of each other, the consistency between them is not a 
sufficient measure of the census validity. In the next section, intercensal survival analysis 
will be applied to further examine the 2010 sex-age structure and to study the mortality and 
aging pattern revealed by the census.
3. Data Quality, Mortality and Population Aging
Because Chinese censuses also collect death information in the year prior to the census, 
intercensal survival analysis, in combination with mortality analysis, provides not only a 
check of the completeness of population enumeration, but also an assessment of mortality 
reporting. It has been shown by previous studies that population data from China are of 
reasonable quality in adult ages (e.g. Banister and Hill 2004; Coale 1985; Coale and 
Banister 1994).
Figure 2 presents the intercensal analysis between 2000 and 2010, together with 10-year life 
table survival ratios based on unadjusted mortality rates from the 2000 and 2010 censuses. 
The life expectancies at age 0 (e0) using unadjusted census mortality rates are: e0m,2000 
=70.7, e0f,2000=74.3, e0m,2010=75.6, e0f,2010=80.4. Several observations can be made based 
on Figure 2.
First, for both males and females, survival ratios beyond age 40 accord closely with life 
table age patterns. For males, the survival ratio line falls right between the two life table 
lines, suggesting a good consistency between age structure data and mortality data from 
these two censuses. For females, the survival ratio line is much closer to the 2000 census life 
table line than to the 2010 life table line, suggesting that mortality for females is likely 
underreported in the 2010 census. Because this analysis is based on single-year age data 
without any smoothing, the remarkable consistency once again confirms the good quality of 
Chinese aging reporting.
Second, if the conventional wisdom holds that young children is more likely to be 
underreported under China’s current population statistical system, Figure 2 suggests that 
there was significant underreporting of children in the 2000 census, and the underreporting 
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is more substantial for females than males. For females, underreporting is as much as 25% 
(at age 1 in 2000) with an average of about 13% for ages 0–9 in 2000; for males, 
underreporting tops at about 20% (at age 1 in 2000) with an average of about 8% for ages 0–
9 in 2000. While at somewhat different levels, male and female underreporting have parallel 
age patterns. Both the level and age patterns of underreporting are similar to what was 
observed in the comparison between 1990 and 2000 censuses (Cai and Lavely 2003; Zhang 
and Cui 2002).
Third, there are some large mismatches between the two censuses in the age range of 10–39 
(in 2000), especially around age 20. For males, the survival ratio dips below life table lines 
for most of the teenage years, but stays above life table lines in age 20s, and drops below in 
age 30s. For females, the mismatches are similar across those three age groups, but less 
dramatic. The mismatches could be caused by enumeration problems in either census, or 
both, thus it is not possible to identify the underlying causes without a third set of data. 
Nevertheless, it is safe to speculate that these mismatches are likely due to some systematic 
problems given their strong age patterns. This issue will be re-examined in the section on 
sex ratio below.
Building on visual examination of Figure 2, the General Growth Balance (GGB) method 
developed by Hill (1987) is applied for both data assessment and mortality estimates. 
Banister and Hill (2004) demonstrate that this method is well suited for Chinese data. In 
light of concerning data quality for those below age 40 in 2000, as having been observed in 
Figure 2, this application uses data from ages 40–79, instead of ages 15–69 as suggested by 
Banister and Hill (2004). The application shows that the two censuses have comparable 
coverage for both males and females in population enumeration.8 Death registration is more 
complete for males than females, in accord with what has been revealed in Figure 2.9 The 
GGB method estimates life expectancy at birth of 72.5 for males, and of 76.1 for females for 
the 2000–2010 intercensal period.
Table 1 compares three sets of key life table measures: the infant mortality rate (q0), life 
expectancy at birth (e0), and life expectancy at age 40 (e40) for China from three sources: 
unadjusted census figures, NBS adjustments10, and estimates derived using the GGB 
method. The GGB estimates for 2000 are taken from Banister and Hill (2004). The GGB 
estimates for 2010 assume proportional mortality decline during the intercensal period. 
Because the application of the GGB method is based on the more “reliable” part of the 
census data, i.e. ages 40–79, as suggested in the data examination presented in Figure 2, life 
expectancies at age 40 are included. Also included are infant mortality rates and life 
expectancies at birth matched from Coale-Demeny’s Model West (1983) with corresponding 
GGB life expectancies at age 40.
As shown in Table 1, for the 2000 census data, NBS only makes minor tweaks. The adjusted 
life expectancies at birth are about one year lower than those calculated directly from 
unadjusted figures, and similar to the estimates provided by Banister and Hill’s (2004) GGB 
8The measures of relatively population enumeration completeness k1/k2 are .9946 and .9920, for males and females respectively.
9The measures of completeness of death reporting (k3) are .9566 and .9002 for males and females respectively.
10http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/t20120921_402838652.htm
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estimates. High female infant mortality rate is one noticeable discrepancy between the 
mortality estimates from China and Coale-Demeny Model West, reflecting unfavorable 
female mortality due to a cultural bias against female infants (Cai and Lavely 2007). 
Although NBS provides no technical details on its adjustments, it is likely that NBS made its 
adjustment based on data from other sources such as mortality data from the Ministry of 
Health. It is also possible that demographic tools such as GGB were used by the NBS to 
derive its estimates.
For the 2010 census, however, NBS’s adjustments are much more substantial. The reported 
infant mortality rates from the 2010 census are only 4.16 per thousand for males and 4.37 
per thousand for females, much lower than the corresponding numbers from the 2000 
census. If those low numbers were real, China would stand in the ranks of countries with the 
lowest infant mortality in the world. Infant mortality from Coale and Demeny’s Model West 
matched with corresponding GGB e40 values suggests underreporting could be substantial. 
NBS adjusted the infant mortality rates upwards to about three times of the census figures 
and life expectancies downwards by about three years. NBS’s adjustments are generally in 
line with GGB-based estimates, with the exception of life expectancy at birth for males, 
which is more than 3 years lower than the unadjusted figure and about 2 years lower than the 
GGB and GGB matched Model West estimates, suggesting that NBS might have over-
adjusted for male mortality underreporting.
The NBS’s adjusted infant mortality rates are very close to estimates provided by the 
Ministry of Health. The Office of China Maternal and Child Health Surveillance 
(MCHSCN) under the Ministry of Health of China collects infant mortality information 
through the National Maternal and Child Health Surveillance Network. It publishes selected 
raw data in its bi-monthly newsletter and adjusted numbers in the China Health Statistical 
Yearbook. Figure 3 presents infant mortality data from the Ministry of Health between 2000 
and 2010. For 2010, the infant mortality rate gathered by the MOH’s surveillance network is 
6.6 per thousand for both sexes. MCHSCN (2010) judged that this 6.6-per-thousand number 
was too low, and adjusted infant mortality upwards by nearly 100% to 13.1 per thousand. 
Figure 3 shows a clear trend of steady infant mortality decline from 2000 to 2010: from 18.4 
per thousand to 6.6 per thousand with raw statistics, and from 32.2 per thousand to 13.1 per 
thousand with adjusted numbers. The close concordance between the MOH adjustment and 
the NBS adjustment is probably not a coincidence.
Another source that can be used to cross-validate mortality reporting in the census is the 
Ministry of Health’s age- and cause-specific mortality data. Since 2006, the Ministry of 
Health has published age- and cause-specific mortality data gathered from a group of 
selected regions. For example, the 2010 data include 10 major cities, 9 regional cities, and 
34 counties. Figure 4 contrasts the mortality age pattern in the MOH data with that from the 
2010 census using the ratio of the two sets.11 A ratio of 1 suggests perfect consistency 
between the two sources; and above 1 indicates a relatively lower mortality rate reported in 
the census. Figure 4 shows that the main difference between the two is in infant and child 
11MOH publishes mortality data separately for rural and urban. Population age structure by rural and urban from the 2010 census is 
used as weights to create the national mortality age profile.
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mortality. For example, mortality rates for ages 5–9 and 10–14 reported by MOH is only 
about 75 percent and 50 percent, respectively, of those reported in the census, but for age 1–
4 males, the rate is double in the MOH data than in the census. For age 15 and above, the 
two sources have a reasonable consistency, while displaying some small gender difference. 
The difference between the two sources can be attributed not only to how death is recorded, 
but also how the at-risk population is calculated. Because the MOH’s publishes its 2010 
mortality data before the release of the 2010 census, it must have used data from the 2000 
census or hukou registration as the base population – as discussed previously, accurately 
counting infants and children has been a major challenge for China. Nevertheless, the real 
difference between the two sources is actually smaller than the impression given by Figure 
4: the difference in the life expectancy at birth calculated from the two sources is only about 
0.5 year.
The comparison of three sets of mortality measures: those taken directly from the census, 
those based on intercensal analysis, and those from MOH’s reporting, on one hand reveals 
problems in China’s mortality and population data, especially the counting of infants and 
children, on the other hand confirms China’s mortality age pattern and continued 
improvement in health. Those data suggest that mortality reduction was substantial between 
the 2000 and 2010 censuses. Before adjusting for mortality underreporting, the census raw 
data show a jump in life expectancy of 5.0 years for males and 6.1 years for females in the 
decade between the 2000 and 2010 censuses. NBS’s adjustment cuts the increase to 2.8 and 
4.0 years for males and female, respectively. Data comparison suggests NBS might have 
over-adjusted for male mortality underreporting.
Even after NBS’s major adjustment, life expectancies at birth in China still rose at a higher 
rate than the world average of about 1.5–2 years per decades (Bongaarts 2006; Oeppen and 
Vaupel 2002; UN 2011). Such a speedy decline of mortality, however, is not unexpected for 
China. Not only did China experience a rapid economic growth for the entire decade under 
this study, it also implemented a major reform of its health care system that has greatly 
expanded its coverage. Both could have had very positive effects on population health and in 
mortality reduction. Moreover, such a speedy decline in mortality has also been observed in 
other countries. For example, between 1980 and 2010, South Korea’s life expectancy at 
birth increased from 65.8 to 80.8, averaging 5.0 years per decade; the increase was 3.8 years 
per decade for Indonesia, and 3.3 years per decade for India (World Bank 2012)12.
Partly due to this rapid improvement in life expectancy, China’s aging process between the 
2000 and 2010 censuses was faster than expected. As highlighted in the Communiqué, 
population at age 60 and above reached a total of 178 million, or 13.26 percent of the total 
population in 2010, up by 2.93 percentage points in just one decade; the population at age 65 
and above reached over 120 million, or 8.87 percent of the total population, up by 1.91 
percentage points as compared with the 2000 census. In comparison, China’s 11th 5-year 
plan projected that the population at 60 and above would reach 174 million by 2010, or 
12.78 percent of the total population; and the 2010 revision of the World Population 
Prospects by UN’s (2011) estimates the number at 60 and above at only 169.4 million, or 
12http://tinyurl.com/aawjd8f
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12.6 percent of the total population.13 One factor behind those low estimates is the 
underestimation of life expectancy. In recognition of rapid mortality reduction, UN’s 2012 
revision of World Population Prospects adjusted China’s current and future life 
expectancies at birth by almost 2 years.
Even with this rapid mortality reduction, mortality’s direct contribution to aging is still 
relatively small in comparison to the more dramatic effect of fertility change. A simple 
standardization exercise that assumes mortality stays at the same level as observed in the 
2000 census suggests that only 6.3 percent of increase at age 60 and above, and 7.8 percent 
of increase at age 65 and above, is from mortality reduction. The rest is from the change in 
population age structure driven mostly by fertility change. However, the rapid progress in 
mortality reduction is going to have a much greater impact in the longer term.
4. Fertility and Sex Ratio
Fertility has been one of the most contentious issues in the study of Chinese population in 
recent decades (Guo 2011, 2013; Gu and Cai 2011; Wang et al. 2013). On one hand, the 
National Population and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC), the government agency in 
charge of implementing China’s one-child policy, and some experts working for the agency, 
have insisted that the low fertility reported in the Chinese data are mostly an artifact of 
underreporting (e.g. Jiang 2006; NPDSRG 2007; NPFPC 2007); on the other hand, many 
demographers working outside of the Chinese government, both domestic and international, 
argue that although underreporting exists to certain degree, China has indeed experienced a 
major transition to a below replacement-level regime (e.g. Cai 2008; Gu and Cai 2011; Guo 
2013; Morgan et al. 2009; NBS and EWC 2007; Retherford et al. 2005; Zhang and Zhao 
2006). In addition to the three-decade long one-child policy, such a transition has unfolded 
in a context of drastic socioeconomic changes over the last few decades, i.e. urbanization, 
industrialization, liberalization, and expansion of education. All these transformations exert 
pressure on the traditional family and reproductive institutions and are thus conducive to 
very low fertility level (Cai 2010; Gu and Wang 2009; Zheng et al. 2009).
The 2010 census provides new evidence of the prevailing low fertility in China over the past 
two decades. Figure 5 compares three different estimates of the TFR. The first is a series 
calculated from unadjusted age-specific fertility rates from China’s annual population 
Surveys/Censuses. Applying the same fertility schedule to corresponding reproductive age 
women as enumerated in the 2010 census, it’s possible to derive two other sets of TFR 
estimates: a second based on the annual number of births reported in the China Statistical 
Yearbooks, and a third matching the cohort size reported in the 2010 census. Be reminded 
that the numbers of births reported in the China Statistical Yearbooks are adjusted figures 
based on the NBS’s internal evaluation.14
13China’s 5-year plan uses year-end figures; no adjustment was made. UN’s projection uses July 1st as standard time; intrapolation is 
used to estimate the population of Nov 1st, 2010.
14No public document is available on how such an adjustment was done. A personal conversation with a retired government official 
who was involved in such work in the 1990s reveals that it was a coordinated effort between the National Bureau of Statistics and the 
National Population and Family Planning Commission.
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These three lines all confirm that fertility in China dropped to below replacement-level at 
the beginning of the 1990s. The process afterwards was somewhat different in the three sets 
of estimates. The NBS’s estimated birth numbers portray a gradual fertility decline. The data 
from population surveys and censuses show small fluctuations and stabilization at a lower 
level for most of the 1990s and 2000s. The 2010 census cohort size indicates that a speedy 
decline continued until 1997 when TFR dropped to below 1.4, followed by a small recovery 
in the first decade of new century. The sudden drop of cohort 2010 is likely to be a repeat of 
underenumeration of infants, which has been seen in previous censuses. All three confirm 
that the fertility level in China by the time of the 2010 census was around 1.5 or lower.15
Examination of the fertility age pattern data suggests that the very low fertility observed in 
the late 1990s and the small reversal of fertility in the first decade of the 21st century could 
be partially attributed to a tempo distortion. Figure 6 presents the proportion of births by 
mother’s age and the mean age at childbearing from 1989 to 2009. The mean age at 
childbearing has risen to over 28 years: it started with a gradual rise with fluctuation up to 
2005, followed with a major jump and a leveling off. In parallel, the distribution of mother’s 
age at childbearing shows a similar trend. At the end of the 1980s, 50 percent births were 
born to mothers of 24 or younger. This proportion declined rapidly over the past two 
decades. By 2010, it had declined to less than 35 percent. At the same time, the proportion 
of births born to mothers age 30 and above increased steadily, rising from around 15 percent 
in the early 1990s to about 20 percent in 2005, and reaching 30 percent in 2009. The small 
increase of fertility in the first decade of the 21 century, as compared with very low fertility 
in late 1990s, can be attributed to this change of fertility age pattern: after a decade-long 
delay, many women eventually had their births in ages that would be regarded as late not too 
long ago: in 2010, the mean ages of parities 1, 2 and 3+ were at 26.7, 30.8, and 33.4, 
respectively.
Related to the debate on fertility level and underreporting is the increased sex imbalance of 
the population (South and Trend 2010; UNFPA 2012). China’s sex ratio at birth has been 
above the normal level of 103–106 since the early 1980s. While its causes are generally 
agreed upon (strong son preference made manifest by constrained low fertility), as is the 
main mechanism (sex selective abortion), its real scale is still inconclusive due to the 
possibility of sex-selective underreporting (Zeng et al. 1993; Gu and Roy 1995; Poston et al. 
2010). Cross-examination of the 1990 and 2000 censuses data show that over a quarter of all 
the missing girls in the 1990 census were hidden in the population and they reappeared in 
the 2000 census (Cai and Lavely 2003). It is possible the same sex selective phenomenon 
could have been repeated between the time of the 2000 and 2010 censuses.
One major surprise in the 2010 census was a drop in the total population sex ratio. The 
population sex ratio increased in the three previous censuses: 106.3 (1982), 106.6 (1990) 
and 106.7 (2000), but dropped to 105.20 in the 2010 census. This sudden drop is indicative 
15The large discrepancy in 1994–2003 is likely a result of Chinese government overreacting to the underreporting problem: the 
Chinese government deemed the low fertility numbers from its own surveys too low to be true; it thus inflated the number of births in 
its annual statistical report. The convergence of the two lines after 2004 reflected the NBS’s recognition of low fertility – the NBS 
publicly acknowledged China’s fertility to be around 1.6 in its assessment of population of 2005 (NBS 2007), breaking away from the 
National Population and Family Planning Commission’s insistence on TFR at the 1.8 level.
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of a potential data problem, because while it is expected that an aging population would tip 
more towards females because females tend to live longer, it is extremely unlikely to have 
such a dramatic shift in the sex balance, given the continued high sex ratio at birth.16
Close data examination suggests that the problem exists mainly in the enumeration of 
cohorts born in recent decades, especially those in the 1980s. The intercensal survival 
analysis, shown in Figure 2, suggests that females have much higher survival ratios for 
cohorts born after 1980. This suggests that the 2010 census recovered a large proportion of 
“missing girls” that were hidden in the population, assuming the sex differential in survival 
ratio is mainly caused by differential underreporting in the 2000 census. Table 2 provides 
both cohort sizes and sex ratios for cohorts born between 1970 and 2010 reported in the 
2000 and 2010 censuses, and from the 2010 hukou data. In total, the 2010 census 
enumerated about 13.9 million more girls for cohorts born between 1971 and 2000, before 
taking into account the mortality effect. In comparison, the 2010 census only enumerated 
about 4.6 million more boys in those same cohorts. It appears that the 2010 census could 
have recovered as many as close to 10 million “missing girls” previously hidden in the 
population for cohorts born between 1981 and 2000. However, the sex ratio for those born in 
1981–1985 and 1986–1990 are too low to be true: 102.2 and 102.5. Assuming a normal sex 
ratio at birth of 105 (boys per 100 girls), the expected sex ratio in ages 20 to 30 should not 
be lower than 104, assuming a normal sex ratio of mortality. Given China’s high sex ratio at 
birth and unfavorable infant and child mortality for females, the real sex ratio for this age 
group is certainly higher. The observed values 102.2 and 102.5 are clear signs of a data 
problem. Thus the total scale of “recovered hidden girls” is certainly smaller than the 10 
million suggested above.
One possible reason is that the 2010 census under-enumerated male population born in 
1981–1990, i.e. males in their 20s at the 2010 census. This is suggested not only by an 
unusual sex ratio in this age group, but also the relatively very low survival ratios compared 
with their surrounding cohorts. It is also consistent with the fact that male population in this 
age group are of the highest mobility, thus most likely to be undercounted by a census. 
Table 2 compares population sizes and sex ratios for those born after 1971 from three 
sources: the 2000 and 2010 censuses and 2010 hukou data. For those born in the 1980s, 
there is a better consistency between the 2000 census and the 2010 hukou data. In other 
words, the lower sex ratio, especially for those of 1981–1990 cohorts in the 2010 census, 
could be a data artifact.
Even for the 1991–1995 birth cohorts, the drop of sex ratio from 115.4 in the 2000 census to 
108.7 in the 2010 census appears too steep. Most in this cohort should be in primary school 
by 2003 – primary school students in China enroll at age 6 or 7. According to China’s 
education enrollment statistics, the sex ratio of primary school students was 112.4 in 2003 
(Table 3), same as the sex ratio of the 1991–1995 cohort recorded in the 2010 hukou data 
(Table 2). Although there is a known cultural bias against females that puts girls at a higher 
risk of not enrolling or of dropping out, given that primary school education is now mostly 
16If the decline of mortality was the main reason for such a reversal, it would mean a major change in male/female mortality pattern: 
it would require a life expectancy (at age 0) gap of around 7–8 years.
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paid by the government, and close to universal, the sex ratio of primary school students 
should not be too much higher than that of the general population of primary school age. 
Using average age of primary school student to gauge sex ratio at birth, the result suggests 
that rising sex ratio was an ongoing phenomenon at least up until 2000, as the sex ratio of 
primary school students continued to rise from 2003 to 2010.
The sex ratio of the 1996–2000 birth cohort observed in the 2010 census is more consistent 
with all three external sources: that of the 2000 census, that of the 2010 hukou data and that 
of enrollment statistics. This indicates that while the 2010 census did recover some “hidden 
missing girls”, e.g. about a quarter of distorted sex ratio for the 1996–2000 cohort can be 
attributed to “hidden girls”.
In sum, the 2010 census once again confirms that the skewed sex imbalance is not a 
statistical artifact, but a reality. The total of “missing girls” in China has jumped from about 
8.5 million revealed by the 2000 census (Cai and Lavely 2003) to more than 20 million (Cai 
2013). Facing this epic challenge, the Chinese government has deployed a wide array of 
measures to reverse the gender imbalance, such as banning the use of pre-natal sex 
determination technology, and launching a “Care for Girls” campaign. Unfortunately, these 
policies have not been very effective in dealing with the problem (Greenhalgh 2013; Li 
2007). Sex selective abortion, albeit illegal, is not difficult to obtain. The “Care for Girls” 
program, though it could have improved girls status within the family, has yet to change 
people’s desire to have a son. The roots of the problem are deep and entrenched in the social 
institutions of the patrilineal family system. Fertility decline, urbanization, and improvement 
in education are slowly changing these institutions, but son preference remains strong in 
rural China (Murphy et al 2011). The sex ratio of those born after the 2000 census is still at 
an alarmingly high level of 118 and above. While there are some positive signs, such as a 
decline in the sex ratio of higher parities, it is still too early to declare that China has turned 
the corner on sex discrimination.
5. Internal Migration, Rapid Urbanization, and Geographic Redistribution
Internal migration and resulting rapid urbanization are the main driving forces behind 
population’s geographic change within China. In contrast to the overall slow population 
growth (averaging annual rate of 0.57 percent between 2000 and 2010) is the enormous 
regional variation across Chinese provinces. Map 1 categorizes Chinese provinces by 
intercensal population growth in four groups: a) rapid growth with population growth at an 
annual rate of 1% or higher, b) modest growth with an annual rate between 0.5% and 1%, c) 
slow growth with an annual rate between 0 and 0.5%, and d) negative growth with 
population loss. The map shows that rapid growth is observed both on the more developed 
east coast, and ethnic minority-concentrated western frontiers. In the middle of the country, 
negative population growth emerged.
A total of 8 provinces recorded population growth at an average annual rate of 1% or higher 
(Map 1 and Table 4). The three fastest growth regions are three urban municipalities: 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. Both Beijing and Tianjin added about 6 million to its 
population in just 10 years, at an average annual growth rate of more than 3%. At this rate, a 
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population would double in just 20 years. The next two high growth provinces are 
Guangdong and Zhejiang, two powerhouses of China’s economic growth. Guangdong added 
about 18 million to its population, making it the most populous province for the first time. 
Although the population of these five provincial level units account for only 13.7 percent of 
China’s total population in 2000 and 16.0 percent in 2010, its share of China’s population 
growth during the decade is more than half of the total at 54.9 percent. Three minority-
concentrated provinces in the western frontiers, Tibet (Xizang), Xinjiang and Ningxia also 
recorded rapid growth in the ten-year period. Because of their small base populations, the 
total growth in these three provinces only accounts for 6 percent of the national total.
Table 4 also decomposes population growth in each province using the population balance 
equation based on annual birth rate and death rates for each province drawn from the China 
Statistical Yearbook. The difference between total population growth and natural growth 
(births minus deaths) is the contribution from migration. Results shown in Table 4 portray a 
sharp contrast between the coastal and the western frontier provinces in their sources of 
population growth. For Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, the three municipalities that recorded 
the fastest population growth, their source is almost entirely from migration. For Guangdong 
and Zhejiang, although in-migration’s contribution is not as large as in Beijing or Shanghai, 
it is still the dominant force, an outcome of economic opportunities that attracted migrants 
from hinterland provinces. On the other hand, the main source of population growth in the 
three minority-concentrated western frontier provinces is natural growth, not surprising 
given that China imposes a less restrictive version of the birth control policy in these areas. 
While these three provinces did have an inflow of migrants, presumably the Han majority 
population from other provinces, they are far from being inundated with Han migrants as 
some have contended.
The true surprise for China is a new demographic phenomenon, in the form of negative 
growth. Between 2000 and 2010, six Chinese provinces recorded population loss, first time 
since the end of the Great Leap Forward famine. Similar to the decomposition analysis for 
population growth in other parts of China, one can compare the relative scale of natural 
change and change due to migration. Table 5 shows that in all 6 provinces recording 
population loss, natural population change is still in the positive territory. The losses are 
therefore entirely due to out-migration. Sichuan alone lost 5.5 million to out-migration. The 
loss is expected to expand from those six provinces to their neighbors, where population 
growth rates have already been below the national average. Should this migration pattern 
continue, and as negative population growth momentum accumulated over the last few 
decades is set in motion, the middle part of China will continue to lose population.
China’s drastic population redistribution in the first decade of the twenty-first century is an 
outcome of rapid urbanization. The 2010 census counted 49.7 percent of Chinese population 
as urban, suggesting that China has reached at historical turning point in its urbanization 
process. Moving from rural to urban, from farming to manufacturing to service, marks 
fundamental changes in social organization and individual life, with profound implication 
for the country’s socioeconomic future. It will also have implication for other demographic 
issues such as childbearing behavior, gender preference, etc.
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Another major factor behind China’s drastic population redistribution is regional economic 
inequality. The more developed coast areas and urban centers attracted migrants from other 
provinces, as indicated by a whopping 261.4 million of Chinese living at a place different 
from their place of household registration. Although the Chinese government has made 
efforts to change regional economic imbalance by investing heavily in the central and 
western parts of the country through its “Western Development Strategy,” the hierarchical 
nature of the state planning has a tendency to favor the more developed areas.
Population redistribution, itself a result of economic imbalance, is likely to further 
exaggerate regional inequality. For example, the selective nature of population migration 
makes Shanghai, despite its extremely low fertility, demographically better prepared for 
aging society because it can attract migrants from other provinces. Meanwhile, the “negative 
growth” areas will not only have a smaller population but also likely be more aging and 
feminized as well as in more shortage of young people.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
Analyses of preliminary census data in this paper show that the 2010 census is of reasonable 
quality, but at the same time contains possible defects that require careful scrutiny. For 
example, while the age structure displays great consistency with previous censuses, again 
attesting the high quality of age reporting, there are considerable discrepancies especially for 
younger age groups. Extremely low infant mortality also suggests problems in death 
counting. Nevertheless, with due caution, the 2010 census data are sufficient to present a 
panoramic picture of demographic changes for China during the first decade of the twenty-
first century.17
China’s 2010 census provides a timely update of the demographic situation in China, and 
indicates the direction of future change. The 2010 census leaves no ambiguity that China’s 
fertility is indeed well below replacement (Guo 2013; Cui et al. 2013; Wang and Ge 2013). 
In fact, more recent data from China suggests that China might have experienced another 
round of fertility decline: the unadjusted TFR dropped four years in a row, to an 
unprecedented 1.04 in 2011 (NBS 2012). It suggests that China might be following its more 
developed neighbors in falling into the “low fertility trap.”(Lutz et al. 2006;) On the 
mortality side, even after discounting for underreporting, China’s improvement in life 
expectancy is faster than expected. This has already contributed to China’s rapid aging 
process, but its longer term impact is going to be more substantial. Despite considerable 
attention devoted to correcting the problem of sex imbalance, the new census data offer no 
sign of relief. Another important new trend is that internal migration is the single most 
important factor and agent behind the rapid population redistribution in China. Mass 
population movement across this vast country not only alters population composition, but 
also brings and stimulates social, economic, and cultural changes.
17More inconsistencies, mismatches, and errors are certainly to be detected. For example, the 2010 census shows that 13 ethnic 
minorities had a population decline between 2000 and 2010, but careful data examination suggests this is mostly due to loss of 
population in migration-prone age groups, presumably because without strong physical features distinguishing them from the Han 
majority, many minority migrants were counted as Hans.
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China’s 2010 census marks another milestone in documenting China’s profound 
demographic change in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The new census data 
confirm and reveal that China has entered a new demographic era, featured by prolonged 
low fertility, persistently elevated sex ratios, rapid aging, massive urbanization and major 
geographic redistribution. These changes have taken place during China’s historical decade 
of economic boom, and within a broad context of rising global competition, economic 
inequality, and political tension. The demographic challenges China now faces, such as 
rapid aging, skewed sex ratios, and labor shortages, are products of fertility decline. 
Unfortunately, China has been slow to acknowledge these problems, and insists to continue 
controversial one-child policy. How China responses these demographic challenges will 
have profound implications for China’s, as well as the world’s, social and economic future.
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Figure 1. Comparison of Population 2010 Age Structure, Census vs. Hukou
Data sources: Census data: NBS 2002, 2012; Hukou data: National Citizen ID Information 
System (NCIIS).
Note: The standard time for the census data is November 1st, 2010. The standard time for the 
Hukou data is July 1st, 2010. No adjustment is made to synchronize the comparison cohorts.
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Figure 2. Intercensal Survival Ratio by Sex and Birth Cohort, China 2000–2010
Data sources: Intercensal survival ratios are calculated from two censuses using data taken 
from census tabulations (including population in military service). Life table survival ratios 
are calculated from unadjusted life tables using mortality rates directly taken from the 
census tabulations.
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Figure 3. Infant Mortality Reported by the Ministry of Health, China 2000–2010
Data sources: adjusted infant mortality rates from the China Health Statistical Yearbook, 
unadjusted infant mortality rates from Newsletter of China Maternal and Child Health 
Surveillance Network, 2010(5) & 2011(4).
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Figure 4. Ratio of Age Specific Mortality Rates: Ministry of Health Registry vs. Census Data, 
China 2010
Data sources: Age specific mortality rates from China Health Statistical Yearbook (2011) 
and the 2010 census.
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Figure 5. Total Fertility by Year, China 1989–2010
Data sources: Unadjusted NBS Population Surveys/Censuses TFRs are calculated from age 
specific fertility rates published in the China Population Statistical Yearbook. Annual 
numbers of births TFRs are derived from annual birth size found in the China Statistical 
Yearbook with women’s age structure from the 2010 census. The “2010 Census Cohort 
Size” TFRs are derived from cohort size enumerated in the 2010 census using women’s age 
structure from the 2010 census.
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Figure 6. Change in the Age Pattern of Fertility and Mean Age at Childbearing, China 1990–
2010
Data sources: Calculated using age specific fertility data published in the China Population 
Statistical Yearbook.
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Figure 7. Map 1. Average Annual Population Growth by Province, China 2000–2010
Data sources: Calculated from population by province in the 2000 and 2010 censuses
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Primary School Students by Sex, China 2003–2009
Year Males (millions) Females (millions) Sex Ratio (per 100) Average Age
2003 61.9 55.0 112.4 9.7
2004 59.7 52.8 113.0 9.7
2005 57.8 50.9 113.6 9.6
2006 57.1 50.0 114.3 9.6
2007 56.5 49.1 115.0 9.5
2008 55.4 47.9 115.6 9.4
2009 54.1 46.6 116.1 9.4
2010 53.5 46.0 116.3 9.3
Data sources: China Education Statistical Yearbook 2003–2010.
Note: Education data use September 1st as the standard time.
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